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Abstract—Increasing numbers of mobile computing devices,
user-portable, or embedded in vehicles, cargo containers, or the
physical space, need to be aware of their location in order
to provide a wide range of commercial services. Most often,
mobile devices obtain their own location with the help of Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), integrating, for example, a
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. Nonetheless, an ad-
versary can compromise location-aware applications by attacking
the GNSS-based positioning: It can forge navigation messages
and mislead the receiver into calculating a fake location. In this
paper, we analyze this vulnerability and propose and evaluate
the effectiveness of countermeasures. First, we consider replay
attacks, which can be effective even in the presence of future
cryptographic GNSS protection mechanisms. Then, we propose
and analyze methods that allow GNSS receivers to detect the
reception of signals generated by an adversary, and then reject
fake locations calculated because of the attack. We consider three
diverse defense mechanisms, all based on knowledge, in particular,
own location, time, and Doppler shift, receivers can obtain prior
to the onset of an attack. We find that inertial mechanisms that
estimate location can be defeated relatively easy. This is equally
true for the mechanism that relies on clock readings from off-the-
shelf devices; as a result, highly stable clocks could be needed. On
the other hand, our Doppler Shift Test can be effective without any
specialized hardware, and it can be applied to existing devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
As wireless communications enable an ever-broadening
spectrum of mobile computing applications, location or posi-
tion information becomes increasingly important for those sys-
tems. Devices need to determine their own position,1 to enable
location-based or location-aware functionality and services.
Examples of such systems include: sensors reporting environ-
mental measurements; cellular telephones or portable digital
assistants (PDAs) and computers offering users information and
services related to their surroundings; mobile embedded units,
such as those for Vehicular Communication (VC) systems
seeking to provide transportation safety and efficiency; or,
merchandize (container) and fleet (truck) management systems.
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), such as the
Global Positioning System (GPS), its Russian counter-part
(GLONAS), and the upcoming European GALILEO system,
are the most widely used positioning technology. GNSS trans-
mit signals bearing reference information from a constellation
1In this paper, we are not concerned with the related but orthogonal
localization problem of allowing a specific entity to determine and ascertain
the location of other devices.
of satellites; computing platforms nodes), equipped with the
appropriate receiver, can decode them and determine their own
location.
However, commercial instantiations of GNSS systems,
which are within the scope of this paper, are open to abuse:
An adversary can influence the location information, loc(V ),
a node V calculates, and compromise the node operation.
For example, in the case of a fleet management system, an
adversary can target a specific truck. First, the adversary can
use a transmitter of forged GNSS signals that overwrite the
legitimate GNSS signals to be received by the victim node
(truck) V . This would cause a false loc(V ) to be calculated
and then reported to the fleet center, essentially concealing
the actual location of V from the fleet management system.
Once this is achieved, physical compromise of the truck (e.g.,
breaking into the cargo or hijacking the vehicle), is possible, as
the fleet management system would have limited or no ability
to protect its assets.
This is an important problem, given the consequences such
attacks can have. In this paper, we are concerned with methods
to mitigate such a vulnerability. In particular, we propose
mechanisms to detect and reject forged GNSS messages, and
thus avoid manipulation of GNSS-based positioning. Our inves-
tigation is complementary to cryptographic protection, which
commercial GNSS systems do not currently provide but are
expected to do so in the future (e.g., authentication services
by the upcoming GALILEO system [5]). Our approach is
motivated by the fundamental vulnerability of GNSS-based
positioning to replay attacks [9], which can be mounted even
against cryptographically protected GNSS.
The contribution of this paper consists of three mechanisms
that allow receivers to detect forged GNSS messages and fake
GNSS signals. Our countermeasures rely on information the re-
ceiver obtained before the onset of an attack, or more precisely,
before the suspected onset of an attack. We investigate mecha-
nisms that rely on own (i) location information, calculated by
GNSS navigation messages, (ii) clock readings, without any re-
synchronization with the help of the GNSS or any other system,
and (iii) received GNSS signal Doppler shift measurements.
Based on those different types of information, our mechanisms
can detect if the received GNSS signals and messages originate
from adversarial devices. If so, location information induced
by the attack can be rejected and manipulation of the location-
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aware functionality be avoided. We clarify that the reaction
to the detection of an attack, and mechanisms that mitigate
unavailability of legitimate GNSS signals is out of the scope
of this paper.
We briefly introduce the GNSS operation and related work
in Sec. II. We discuss the adversary model and specific attack
methods in Sec. III-B. We then present and analyze the three
defensive mechanisms in Sec. IV. Our findings support that
highly accurate clocks can be very effective at the expense
of appropriate clock hardware; but they can otherwise be
susceptible, when off-the-shelf hardware is used. Location-
based mechanisms can also be defeated relatively easily. On
the contrary, our Doppler Shift Test (DST) provides accurate
detection of attacks, even against a sophisticated adversary.
II. GNSS OVERVIEW
A. Basic Operation
Each GNSS-equipped node V can receive simultaneously
a set of navigation messages NAVi from each satellite Si
in the visible constellation. Satellite transmitters utilize a
spread-spectrum technique and each satellite is assigned a
unique spreading code Ci. These codes are a priori publicly
known. Navigation messages allow V to determine its position,
loc(V ) = (XV , YV , ZV ), in a Cartesian system, as well global
time, by obtaining a clock correction or time offset, tV , also
called the synchronization error. At least four satellites should
be visible in order for a receiver to compute position and
exact time, the so-called PVT (Position, Velocity and Time) or
navigation solution [6]. This computation relies on the pseudo-
range measurements performed by V , one pseudo-range per
visible satellite, that is, estimating the satellite-receiver distance
based on the estimated signal propagation delay, ρi. For each
pseudo-range ρi estimated at V , the following equation is
formed:
ρi = |si − loc(V )|+ c · tV (1)
The satellite Si position is si, the receiver position is loc(V ),
c is the speed of light, and tV is the synchronization error for
V .
B. Future Cryptographic GNSS Protection
Cryptographic protection ensures the authenticity and in-
tegrity of GNSS messages, i.e., ensures that NAV messages
generated solely by GNSS entities, with no modification, are
accepted and used by nodes. Currently, cryptography is used in
military systems, but it is not available for commercial systems
to provide authenticity and integrity. Public or asymmetric key
cryptography is a flexible and scalable approach that does
not require tamper-resistant receivers.2 Independently of the
number of receivers present in the system (possibly, millions
or eventually hundreds of millions), a pair of private/public
keys ki,Ki can be assigned to each satellite Si, with the
public key bound to the satellite identity via a certificate
provided by a Certification Authority. Each receiver obtains
the certified public keys of all satellites in order to be able to
2To prevent the compromise of a single, system-wide symmetric key, shared
among the GNSS and all nodes.
validate NAV messages digitally signed with the corresponding
ki. Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) [5] will be
available as a GALILEO service.
To further enhance protection, a different public-key NMA
approach was proposed in [7]. Each Si chooses a secret
spreading code for each NAV message but discloses this, along
with a hidden timing marker, in a delayed and authenticated
manner to the receiving nodes. If nodes can maintain accurate
clocks by means other than the GNSS system alone, they can
then safely detect messages that are forged or replayed between
the time of their creation and the code disclosure. A similar
idea using Secret Spreading Codes (SSC) was presented in
[11].
III. ATTACKING GNSS
A. Adversary model
The location (position) GNSS-equipped nodes obtain can be
manipulated by an external adversary, without any adversarial
control on the GNSS entities (the system ground stations,
the satellites, the ground-to-satellite communication, and the
receiver). If any cryptographic protection is present, we assume
that cryptographic primitives are not breakable and that the
private keys of satellites cannot be compromised. The adversary
can receive signals from all available satellites (depending
on the locations of the adversary-controlled receivers). It is
also fully aware of the GNSS implementation specifics and
thus can produce fully compliant signals, i.e., with the same
modulation, transmission frequency equal to the nominal one,
ft, or any frequency in the range of received ones, fr; similarly,
transmitted and received signal powers, as well as message
preambles and body format (header, content).
We classify adversaries based on their ability to reproduce
GNSS messages and signals, considering ones equipped with:
1) Single or multiple radios, each transmitting at the same
constant power, P ct , and frequency fct .
2) Single or multiple radios, each being ability to adapt its
transmission frequency, f jt , over time; j is an index of
adversarial radios.
3) Multiple radios with adaptive transmission capabilities as
above, and additionally the ability to establish fast com-
munication among any of the adversarial nodes equipped
with those radios.
Adversarial radios in all above cases can record GNSS
signals and navigation messages for long periods. For all
adversaries above, we consider a nominal range R, within
which adversarial transmissions can be received, with this value
varying for different adversarial radios. We denote this as the
area under attack. Clearly, the more powerful and the more
numerous radios an adversary has, the higher its potential
impact can be. In the sense, it can influence a larger system
area and potentially mislead more receivers.
We assume that the area under attack does not coincide
with the wireless system area. In other words, the adversary
has limited physical presence and communication capabilities.
This implies that nodes can lock on actual GNSS signals for a
period of time before entering an area under attack. We do not
dwell on how frequently and under what circumstances nodes
are under attack. Rather, we investigate the strength of different
defense mechanisms given that a node is under attack. We
abstract the physical properties of the adversarial equipment
and consider the periods of time it can cause unavailability
and maintain the receiver locked on the spoofed signal.
We emphasize that our attack model is not the worst case;
this would be a receiver under attack during its cold start, that
is, the first time it is turned on and searches for GNSS signals to
lock on. However, our adversary model corresponds to a broad
range of realistic cases and it is a powerful one. For example,
returning to the cargo example of the introduction: It will be
hard for an adversary to control a receiver from its installation,
e.g., on a container, and then throughout a trip. But it would
be rather easy to select a location and time to mount its attack.
Regarding the strength of the attacker, it is noteworthy that
attacks are possible without any physical access to and without
tampering with the victim node(s) software and hardware.
B. Mounting Attacks against GNSS Receivers
The adversary can construct a transmitter that emits signals
identical to those sent by a satellite, and mislead the receiver
that signals originate from a visible satellite. However, the
attacker has to first force the receiver to lose its “lock” on the
satellite signals. This can be achieved by jamming legitimate
GNSS signals, by transmitting a sufficiently powerful signal
that interferes with and obscures the GNSS signals [12]. Jam-
mers are simple to construct with low cost and very effective:
for example, with 1 Watt of transmission power, the reception
of GNSS signals is stopped within a radius of approximately
35 km radius [6], [12].
Then, the adversary can spoof GNSS signals, i.e., forge and
transmit signals at the same frequency and with power that
exceeds that of the legitimate GNSS signal at the receiver’s
antenna. Satellite simulators are capable of broadcasting si-
multaneously signals carrying counterfeit navigation data from
ten satellites.3 The spoofed signal can also be generated by
manipulating and rebroadcasting actual signals (meaconing).
As long as the lock of the victim receiver V on the spoofed
signal persists, loc(V ) is under the influence or full control of
the adversary.
Apart from jamming, the adversary could take advantage of
gaps in coverage, i.e., areas and periods of time for which V
cannot lock on to more than three satellite signals. Clearly, this
can be often possible in urban areas or because of the terrain,
such as tunnels or obstructions from high-rise buildings. We do
not consider further this case, as such loss of satellite signals
is not under the control of the attacker. Nonetheless, the tests
we propose here are effective independently of what causes
receivers to loose lock on GNSS signals.
3The adversary can deceive the receiver after down-conversion of the
satellite signal, with one component in-phase and one in-quadrature:
I(t) = aiCa(t)M(t)cos(ft) (2)
Q(t) = aqCa(t)M(t)sin(ft) (3)
Ca is the C/A (Course/Aquisition) code, M(t) is the NAV message, and
coefficients ai and aq represent the signal attenuation. The attacker could
pick the amplifying coefficients ai and aq such that the received signal power
exceeds the nominal power od a GPS signal [13].
C. Replay attack
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the replay attack: the adversary captures and replays
the signal after some time treplay = tminreplay + τ , with the τ ≥ 0 chosen
by the adversary, and tminreplay > 0 imposed by the specifics of the attack
configuration and the adversary capabilities.
The replay attack can be viewed as a part of a more general
class of relay attacks: the attacker receives at one location
legitimate GNSS signals, relays those to another location where
it retransmits them without any modification. This way the
adversary can avoid detection if cryptography is employed,
while it can “present” a victim with GNSS signals that are
not normally visible at the victim’s location. In this paper,
we abstract away the placement of adversarial nodes, and
we characterize the replay attack by two features: (i) the
adversarial node capability to receive, record and replay GNSS
signals, and (ii) the delay treplay between reception and re-
transmission of a signal.
The GNSS signal reception and replay can be done at the
message or symbol level, or it can be done by recording the
entire frequency band and replaying it without de-spreading
signals. The latter, more involved and thus costly, would enable
the attacker to mount an attack against the delayed-disclosure
secret spreading code approach, as pointed out in [7], not
only for long replaying delays but also for very short ones.
Clearly, such an instantiation of the replaying attack implies
a more sophisticated adversary than one replaying symbols
or messages. For example, the adversary would need to infer,
possibly by possessing a legitimate receiver, the start of NAV
messages to replay signals accordingly
The treplay delay between reception and re-transmission
depends on the attack configuration (e.g., the distance between
the receiving and re-transmitting adversarial radios, the physics
of the signal propagation, and, when applicable, the delay for
the adversary to decode the GNSS signal). We capture such
factors by considering tminreplay > 0, a minimum delay that the
adversary cannot avoid. Beyond this, the attacker can choose
some additional delay τ ≥ 0, such that it replays the signal after
treplay = tminreplay + τ . We illustrate a replay attack in Fig. 1:
The recording of the NAV message starts after its beginning is
detected, due to the preamble 10001011, with length of eight
chips, and the decoding of the NAV message first bit. This
corresponds to tminreplay = 20ms: the transmission rate of 50
bit/s implies that 20ms are needed for the first bit to be received
by an adversarial radio.
The adversary can choose different treplay values for signals
0 50 100 150 200 250 3000
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
Attack duration  [s]
D
is
ta
nc
e 
of
fs
et
  [m
]
(a)
0 50 100 150 200 250 3000
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Attack duration [s]
Ti
m
e 
of
fs
et
   
[m
s]
 
 
(b)
Fig. 2. Impact of the replay attack, as a function of the spoofing attack
duration. (a) Location offset or error: Distance between the attack-induced and
the actual victim receiver position. (b) Time offset or error: Time difference
between the attack-induced clock value and the actual time.
from different satellites, even though “blind” replaying of all
NAV signals with the same delay can be effective. The selection
of which signals (from which satellites) to relay offer flexibility.
But even the “blind” replaying of all NAV signals (the entire
band) can be effective: treplay controls the “shift” in the PVT
solution. Essentially, treplay controls the “shift” in the PVT
solution the adversary induces to the victim node(s).
Fig. 2 shows the impact of a replay attack as a function of
the spoofing stage of the attack: (i) the location offset or error,
i.e., the distance between the attack-induced and the actual
victim receiver position, and (ii) the time offset or error, that is,
the time difference between the attack-induced clock value and
the actual time. We consider for this example trelay = 20ms,
as the first bit decoding delay dwarfs the preamble detection
and propagation delays. This is indeed a very subtle attack we
refer to [9] for a range of treplay values, which shows that the
larger the treplay , as the adversary tunes its τ value, the higher
the location and time offsets.
Even for a very low treplay , while the mobile node receiver
is still locked on the attacker-transmitted signals, the location
error increases, with the victim receiver “dragged” away from
its actual position. Each millisecond of trelay translates ap-
proximately into 300m of location offset for each pseudorange
(as the speed of light, c, is taken into account), with the actual
“displacement” of the victim depending on the geometry (e.g.,
position of the satellite whose signals were replayed).
As for the time offset, which can be viewed as a side-effect
of the attack: it is in the order of less than one millisecond
per second, and it can very well go easily unnoticed by the
user. With a given trelay , every time the victim receiver re-
synchronizes, typically at the end of a NAV message that lasts
30 sec, treplay will emerge as tV from the PVT solution and
thus will be accumulated as part of the time offset shown in
Fig. 2.
IV. DEFENSE MECHANISMS
We investigate three defense mechanisms that rely on a
common underlying three-step idea. First, the receiver collects
data for a given parameter during periods of time it deems it
is not under attack; we term this the normal mode. Second,
based on the normal mode data, the receiver predicts the
value of the parameter in the future. When it suspects it is
under attack, it enters what we term alert mode. In this mode,
the receiver compares the predicted values with the ones it
obtains from the GNSS functionality. If the GNSS-obtained
values differ, beyond a protocol-selectable threshold, from the
predicted ones, the receiver deems it is under attack. In that
case, all PVT solutions obtained in alert mode are discarded.
Otherwise, the suspected PVT solutions are accepted and the
receiver reverts to the normal mode.
In this work, we consider three parameters: location, time,
and Doppler Shift, and we present the corresponding detection
mechanisms, Location Inertial Test, Clock Offset Test, and
Doppler Shift Test. We emphasize again that all three mecha-
nisms rely on the availability of prior information collected in
normal mode. But they are irrelevant if the receiver starts its
operation without any such information (i.e., a cold start).
To evaluate the proposed schemes, we use GPS traces
collected by an ASHTECH Z-XII3T receiver that outputs
observation and navigation (.obs and .nav) data into RINEX
(Receiver Independent Exchange Format) [8]. We implement
the PVT solution functionality in Matlab, according to the
receiver interface specification [8]. Our implementation op-
erates on the RINEX data, which include pseudoranges and
Doppler frequency shift and phase measurements. We simulate
the movement of receivers over a period of T = 300s, with
their position updated at steps of Tstep = 1sec.
A. Location Inertial Test
At the transition to alert mode, the node utilizes own
location information obtained from the PVT solution, to predict
positions while in attack mode. If those positions match the
suspected as fraudulent PVT ones, the receiver returns to
normal mode. We consider two approaches for the location
prediction: (i) inertial sensors and (ii) Kalman filtering.
Inertial sensors, i.e., altimeters, speedometers, odometers,
can calculate the node (receiver) location independently of the
GNSS functionality.4 However, the accuracy of such (electro-
mechanical) sensors degrades with time. One example is the
low-cost inertial MEMS Crista IMU-15 sensor (Inertial Mea-
surement Unit).
Fig. 3 shows the position error as a function of time [4],
which is in our context corresponds to the period the receiver
is in the alert mode. As the inertial sensor inaccuracy increases,
4They have already been used to provide continuous navigation between
the update periods for GNSS receivers, which essentially are discrete-time
position/time sensors with sampling interval of approximately one second
the node has to accept as normal attack-induced locations.
Fig. 4 shows a two-dimensional projection of two trajectories,
the actual one and the estimated and erroneously accepted one.
We see that over a short period of time, a significant difference
is created because of the attack.
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Fig. 3. Location error of Crista IMU-15 inertial sensor, as a function of the
GNSS unavailability period.
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Fig. 4. Illustration of location error using inertial sensors: Actual vs. estimated
when under attack trajectory.
A more effective approach is to rely on Kalman filtering of
location information obtained during normal mode. Predicted
locations can be obtained by the following system model:
Sk+1 = ΦkSk + Wk (4)
with Sk being the system state, i.e., location (Xk, Yk, Zk) and
velocity (V xk, V yk, V zk) vectors, Φk the transition matrix,
and Wk the noise. Fig. 5 illustrates the location offset for a set
of various trajectories. Unlike the case that only inertial sensors
are used, with measurements of inertial sensors (with the error
characteristics of Fig. 3 used as data when GNSS signals are
unavailable, filtering provides a linearly increasing error with
the period of GNSS unavailability.
Overall, for short unavailability periods, inertial mechanisms
can be effective. As long as the error (Y axes of Figs. 4, 5) does
not grow significantly, the replay attack can be detected. But
for sufficiently high errors, the replay attack impact can remain
undetected. We remind the reader that the x-axes in Fig. 2
provide the duration of the spoofing attack - the transmission
(replay) of GNSS signals - and they are not to be confused
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Fig. 5. Distance error of inertial mechanisms with Kalman filtering, as a
function of the GNSS unavailability period.
with the duration of the GNSS period of unavailability in the
x-axis of Figs. 4, 5.
B. Clock Offset Test
Each receiver has a clock that is in general imprecise, due
to the drift errors of the quartz crystal. If the reception of
GNSS signals is disrupted, the oscillator switches from normal
to holdover mode. Then, the time accuracy depends only on the
stability of the local oscillator [2], [6]. The quartz crystals of
different clocks run at slightly different frequencies, causing
the clock values to gradually diverge from each other (skew
error).
A simulation based study [2] of quartz clocks claims that
coarse time synchronization can be maintained at microsecond
accuracy without GPS reception for 350 sec in 95% cases.
This means that quartz oscillators can maintain millisecond
synchronization for few hours, including random errors and
temperature change inaccuracies. Indeed, in such a case, the
adversary would need to cause GNSS availability for long
periods of time, for example, tens of hours, before being able
to mount a relay attack that causes a time offset in the order
of tens of milliseconds.
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Fig. 6. Clock offset for the ASHTECH Z-XII3T receiver, during a 900 sec
period with no re-synchronization.
However, without highly stable clocks, mounting attacks
against the Clock Offset Test can be significantly easier. This
can be the case for a ASHTECH receiver, for which time
offset values are shown at successive points in time, each 30
seconds apart, in Fig. 6. We clarify this is not to be perceived
as criticism for a given receiver or to be the basis for the
suitability of the Clock Offset Test. As explained above, the
stability of the receiver clock determines the strength of this
test. But the data in Fig. 6, over a period of 900 seconds,
exactly demonstrates that for commodity receivers significant
instability is observed; time offset values are in the order of
ten milliseconds (or slightly less). Consequently, the adversary
would need to jam for roughly a couple of minutes, force the
receiver to consider as acceptable a time offset of 20 to 32
milliseconds, and thus be mislead by a replay attack as detailed
in Sec. III.
Finally, we note that we do not consider here the case
of synchronization by means external to the GNSS system.
For example, if the receiver could connect to the Internet and
run NTP, it could obtain accurate time. But this would be an
infrequent operation (in the order of magnitude of days), thus
useful only if highly stable clock hardware were available.
C. Doppler Shift Test (DST)
Based on the received GNSS signal Doppler shift, with
respect to the nominal transmitter frequency (ft = 1.575GHz),
the receiver can predict future Doppler Shift values. Once lock
to GNSS signals is obtained again, predicted Doppler shift
values are compared to the ones calculated due to the received
GNSS signal. If the latter are different than the predicted ones
beyond a threshold, the GNSS signal is deemed adversarial and
rejected. What makes this approach attractive is the smooth
changes of Doppler shift and the ability to predict it with low,
essentially constant errors over long periods of time. This in
dire in contrast to the inertial test based on location, whose
error grows exponentially with time.
The Doppler shift is produced due to the relative motion of
the satellite with respect to the receiver. The satellite velocity
is computed using ephemeris information and an orbital model
available at the receiver. The received frequency, fr, increases
as the satellite approaches and decreases as it recedes from
the receiver; it can be approximated by the classical Doppler
equation:
fr = ft · (1− vr · a
c
) (5)
where ft is nominal (transmitted) frequency, fr received fre-
quency, vr is the satellite-to-user relative velocity vector and c
speed of radio signal propagation. The product vr ·a represents
the radial component of the relative velocity vector along the
line-of-sight to the satellite.
If the frequency shift differs from the predicted shift for each
visible satellite Si in the area depending on the data obtained
from the almanac (in the case when the navigation history is
available), for more than defined thresholds (Δfmin,Δfmax)
or estimated Doppler shift from navigation history differs for
more than the estimated shift, knowing the rate (r), the receiver
can deem the received signal as product of attack.
The Almanac contains approximate position of the satellites,
(Xsi, Y si, Zsi), time and the week number (WN, t), and the
corrections, such that the receiver is aware of the expected
satellites, their position, and the Doppler offset.
Because of the high carrier frequencies and large satellite
velocities, large Doppler shifts are produced (±5kHz), and
vary rapidly (1 Hz/s). The oscillator of the receiver has
frequency shift of ±3KHz, thus the resultant frequency shift
goes therefore up to ±9KHz. Without the knowledge of the
shift, the receiver has to perform a search in this range of
frequencies in order to acquire the signal. The rate of Doppler
shift receiving frequency caused by the relative movement
between GPS satellite and vehicles approximately 40 Hz per
minute to the maximum. These variations are linear for every
satellite. If the receiver is mobile, the Doppler shift variation
can be estimated knowing the velocity of the receiver( [3]).
In our simulations, Doppler shift is analyzed for each
available satellite (number of available satellites varies). To be
consistent with results shown for other mechanisms, we present
results for DST for the 300sec period.
50 100 150 200 250 300
2300
2350
2400
2450
2500
2550
2600
2650
2700
2750
Time [s]
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
fs
et
 [H
z]
 
 
Measured Doppler shift [Hz ] 
Linear approximation
Prediction bounds
Fig. 7. Measured and approximated Doppler frequency shift.
We observe in Fig. 7 the Doppler shift variation based on
data collected by an ASHTECH receiver: the maximum change
in rate is within +/− 20Hz around a linear curve fitted to the
data. This clues that with sufficient samples, the future Doppler
Shift rate, and thus the shift per se, values can be predicted. In
practice, we observe that 50 sec of samples, with one sample
per second, appear to be sufficient.
More precisely, the rate of change of the frequency shift,
Di(t), is computed for each satellite, Si, as:
ri =
dDi(t)
dt
(6)
which can be approximated by numerical methods. Based on
prior samples for each Di, available for some time window the
frequency shift can be predicted based those samples and the
estimate rate of change of the Doppler shift. Based on prior
measured statistics of the signal at the receiver, the variance
σ2 of a random component, assumed to be N(0, σ2), can be
estimated. This random component is due to signal variation
(including receiver mobility, RF multipath, scattering). Its
estimation can serve to determine an acceptable interval around
the predicted values.
The adversary is mostly at the ground and static or moving
with speed that is much smaller than the satellite velocity,
which is in a range around 3km/s. Thus, the adversary will
not be able to produce the same Doppler shift as the satellites,
unless it changes its transmission frequency to match the one
receivers would obtain from GNSS signals due to the Doppler
shift. An unsophisticated attacker would then be easily de-
tected. This is illustrated in Fig. 8: After a “gap” corresponding
to jamming, there is a striking difference, between 100 and 150
seconds, when comparing the Doppler shift due to the attack
to the predicted one.
The case of A sophisticated adversary that controls its
transmission frequency (the attack starts at 160s)is shown in
the Fig. 9. The adversary has multiple adaptive radios and
it operates according to the following principle: it predicts
the Doppler frequency shift at the location of the receiver,
and it then changes its transmission frequency accordingly. If
the attacker is not precisely aware of the actual location and
motion dynamics of the victim node (receiver), there is still a
significant difference between the predicted and the adversary-
caused Doppler shift. This is shown, with a magnitude of
approximately 300 Hz, in Fig. 9; a difference that allows
detection of the attack.
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Fig. 8. Doppler shift attack; unsophisticated adversary. The dotted line
represents the predicted and the solid line the measured frequency offset.
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Fig. 9. Doppler shift attack; sophisticated adversary. The dotted line represents
the predicted and the solid line the measured frequency offset.
V. CONCLUSION
Existing GNSS receivers are vulnerable to a number of
attacks that manipulate the location and time the receivers
compute. We qualitatively and quantitatively analyze those
in this paper, and identify memory-based mechanisms that
can help in securing GNNS signals. In particular, we realize
that location-based inertial mechanisms and a clock offset test
can be relatively easily defeated, with the adversary causing
(through jamming) a sufficiently long period of unavailability.
In the latter case, only specialized highly stable clock hard-
ware could enable detection of fraudulent GNSS signals. Our
Doppler Shift Test provides resilience to long unavailability
periods without specialized equipment.
Our results are the first, to the best of our knowledge,
to provide tangible demonstration of effective mechanisms to
secure mobile systems from location information manipulation
via attacks against the GNSS systems.
As part of on-going and future work, we intent to further
refine and generalize the simulation framework we utilized
here, to consider precisely the effect of counter-measures
that only partially limit the attack impact. Moreover, we will
consider more closely the cost of mounting attacks of differ-
ing sophistication levels, especially through proof-of-concept
implementations.
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